Prior to the breakdown of the iron curtain, and the fall of communist regimes in the East and Central Europe, the issue of democratization were not seriously perceived in most part of the world as administrative option. It was hitherto seen as an uncertain and fragile process typified by different authoritarian delay of government business, mostly but not exclusively in Africa, Asia and Latin America. However, in contemporary time while some scholars are of the view that democratization is the only panacea for national development because of its essential attributes, other scholars contends fervently that its national development that herald democratization and not the other way round. Still others accentuate the important of authoritarian regime as a condition sena qua non for national development. This study conversely, attempts to address this lacuna or perception controversy, with data empirically generated from the secondary source, to analyze the nature and relationship between democratization, political dictatorship and national development in the post Suharto Indonesia. Specifically, it examined whether the process of democratization in the country enhances their national development. This study however, reveals that national development is neither exclusively related to democratic political system nor authoritarian political regime.

**Key word:** Political dictatorship, democratization, national development, unemployment and GDP growth rate.

**INTRODUCTION**

**Indonesia road to democratization:** The concept of democratization is seen by political economy scholars as a process of institutionalization of the major democratic principles, as part of everyday socio-cultural activities in a given society. Historically, democratization seemed a delicate and unattainable process in Africa, Latin America and Asia. But this attitude took a drastic turn in the early 1990s when the wind of democratization powered by the development of capitalism swept through Africa and Asia among other continents to bring and, or stimulate greater optimism. Indonesia was affected by the democratic epidemic in 1998, its total land area is approximately 1,904,569 km² the country share land boundaries with Papua New Guinea, East Timor, and Malaysia Borneo. However, some of the Indonesia neighboring countries are Singapore, the Philippines, Australia and Papua. Including the India territory of Andaman and Nicobar. The country is also known as the third largest democratic country globally after the United States and the India Republic. The method, process and or progress of Indonesia democratic implementation are rather more rapid than other Asia countries (Sørensen, 2010). However, Indonesia just like most developing countries has experienced several attempts at democracy, before reaching their present stage in the democratization process. They have experimented three different types of democracy, all of which failed. The first one was the, “parliamentary democracy” (1949–1957) whose inability to meet the people's demand led to the transition to the “guided democracy” (1957–65). It was in this administration that president Sukarno introduced a system of government known as “Zaken” or functional cabinet, a business cabinet comprising of the Economist, political party members, and the military. However, the shortcomings of the ‘guided democracy’ led to the establishment of the “Pancasila Democracy” (1966 – 1998) which was third and most used by President Suharto (Liddle, 2001).

**Guided democracy:** Damokrasi Terpinipin as it is popularly called in Indonesia, concentrated power on the executive arm of the government, specifically on the president. The dissimilarity between guided democracy and liberal democracy cannot be ignored, while the liberal democracy put special importance on the process, guided democracy stresses the attainment of a particular major objective; an equitable and flourishing society, that can only be achieved through a systematic and planned democracy. President Sukarno fondly refers to it as ‘democracy with leadership’. As we discussed earlier, the guided democracy come into effect in Indonesia from July 1959 up to October 1965 slightly more than six years, however, that variant of democracy failed to achieve a robust economic system in Indonesia. In fact by 1965 the economy became dire, production slowed down and import and export came to a dramatic stand still. Consequently a hyperinflation of over 600 percent brought the economy to its knees. The economic crisis was followed by public outcry and political pandemonium that led to power struggle between the military and Indonesian communist party, on March 11th 1966 president Sukarno was forced by the military top chiefs to step aside following the murder of six army generals and six lieutenants by some left wing elements in the Indonesian military (Dosch, 2007). And this
brought the president Sukarno ‘guided democracy’ to a celebrated death.

**The Pancasila democracy:** Pancasila democracy which lasted from 1966–1999 is a type of government that is rooted on five basic principles of national ‘pancasila’ ideology. When military took over power General Suharto became the head of state and introduced the term ‘Orde Baru’ meaning ‘New Order’ and called the Sukarno’s guided democracy “Orde Lama” which means ‘Old order’ and a rotten bankrupt system. (Liddle, 2001). At first the Orde Baru appears to be ushering in a new era in Indonesian politics when it freed, political prisoners, unites the press, by suspending some institutionalized restriction on some newspapers that were closed down by the previous regime. Put differently, it can be argued that a process of liberalization was established by Suharto’s government in Indonesia. During the era of the ‘Orde Baru’ Suharto’s government was outwardly a success, because it provides a long period of security and conservation of economic and political interest between the president and the military. But after the famous Indonesian economic crisis in July, 1997 the national security stability were challenged by social melee and mass killing in jakarta in May 1998, at that point the harmonized interest between the army and the government were inexorably diverged from those of the Suharto family (Abdullah, 2009).

As a corollary, Indonesia underwent what Huntington (1993) refers to as “the initial stage of democratization “bringing the non-democratic regime in Indonesia to unceremonious end. The fall of the ‘Orde Baru’ which was triggered by Suharto” inability to manage the impact of the Asia Financial Crisis (AFC) for Indonesia, resulted in Megawati Sukartoputri, Abdurahman Wahid, and Sri Sultan Hamengkubuwono’s organizing of pro-democratic movement in Jakarta against the regime (Aspinall, 2005; Crouch, 2010). The highest percentage of this movement is comprised of mainly low income earners who are protesting for price increase in some essential commodity. And the middle class, compromising of students, religious leaders, NGO activists and lawyers (Onj, 1991). These groups were united and motivated by a common interest, specifically distrust towards the ruling military and a very strong desire to wage war against corruption collusion and nepotism, public referred to in Indonesia as KKN (Korupsi, Kolusi dan Nepo tisme). This movement gradually climaxed and got the attention of the military regime, among the series of demands includes an overhaul of the entire Indonesia political and administrative system, to engender greater accountability transparency and the supremacy of the law, which subsumes respect for human right (Abdullah, 2009). The political pressure resulted in the resignation of some key members of the Suharto’s cabinets among which were the coordinating minister of economic and industrial affairs Ginandjar Kartasasmita, And The Minister of State secretariat, Akba Jangung, which were too pugnacious for Suharto’s administration to contain. This mass resignation enables Suharto to understand that he has lost legitimacy and necessary political support to sustain his regime, consequently the regime atrophied. And that gives rise to President; Baharudin Jusuf (BJ) Habibe who was inaugurated as president on the 21st of May 1998. The major hallmark of Habibies’ administration was his aspiration for decentralization which completely contradicts Suharto’s centralized politics, he is also responsive to public demand for more regional autonomy obligatorily allowing all the regions to be self governed on all matters that concerns them, of cause with the exception of foreign policy, defense fiscal and monetary matter, security, the judiciary and religious affairs (Hefner, 2011). However, Abdulrahman Wahid, continued the Indonesia democratization process after he was elected president, following the fall of Hbie, which was facilitated by parliament.

During Wahid’s reign, he revoked Suharto’s decree No 41/987 on restriction of Chinese religious practices. Thereby encouraging religious freedom in Indonesia, he also restored civilian supremacy over the military which was a taboo under his predecessors. His administration however, come to abrupt end on the 20th July 2001, after series of allegation and political ballyhoo associated with his involvement in several corruption cases coupled with his erratic behavior, president Wahid was forced to step aside. And Megawati took over the mantle of leadership from Wahid as the vice president. During president Megawati’s era (2001-2004) she tried to establish a conducive environment upon which their democratization process can be consolidated. The hallmark of her administration was the promotion of good governance and transparency by establishing the Corruption Eradication Commission CEC, popularly known as Komisi pemberantasan Korupsi KPK, it must be noted that her administration was faced with a number of challenges and opportunities as well, emanating from both domestic and foreign policies. The most notable among which was the Indonesian Muslim communities’ reaction towards her status as a female president. Her presidency was abysmally rejected by a number of Islamic groups including that of her vice president’s, not on the ground of any constitutional breach but strictly on gender and Islamic faith. However, her defeat in the 2004 presidential elections open doors to the rise of a former General, Susito Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) who contested with Jusuf Kalla of the Golkar Party (Hensengerth, 2011). In this particular general election that ousted Megawati, SBY and Kalla won more them 61% of the total vote. And the subsequent parliamentary elections that took place the same year, in April precisely was a multi-party election, in other words over twenty four political parties contested in that election, the majority of which were new political parties. Finally, the last Indonesia presidential election before this study, which was their third was held on the 9th of July 2014. Prominent among the contestants were the former military general and Suharto’s ex-son in law, Prabowo Subianto and the former governor of Jakarta, Joko Widodo. On the 22nd of July 2014. The General Election Commission announced Joko Widodo as the victor. On the
twentieth October 2014 Joko widodo and his vice president Jusuf Kalla were sworn in to office for a five years term (Azra, 2003). The establishment of a functional democratic electoral system coupled with a good number of domestic achievements, such as improved economic performance, and relative conflict resolution mechanism, e.g. In Aceh, and the promises of a refined human right situation serves as a signal of Indonesia's democratic potentials.

Non-democratic regime and national development: As we have argued in this study, democracy is not just one of, but the most accepted system of government globally. This acceptability is however, derived from those essential doctrines or mechanism with which it operates such as the rule of law, justice, liberty, higher participation, and among other things, the method of maintaining order among the people. Unfortunately these attribute, especially higher participation are also its sources of scholarly attack. The validity of democratic hypothesis has been called into questions. It has been argued that the tendency of a democratic political system to diffuse, fragment and divide political authority among different stakeholders at different level of administration, within the state, including societal actors has rendered the decision making process more time consuming (Dahl, 1971). This reality has led many academic analysts and even policy makers to contend that in the developing third world countries, that authoritarian regimes may be better than the democratic system in enhancing national development. As has already been noted by (Halperin et al., 2005) “The appeal of authoritarian-led approach has at least something to do with its expediency, in comparison to the many and time consuming procedures typical of democracy” (Halperin et al., 2005). The analytical utility of this argument seems to be implying that, development in any society requires a strong, centralized, and highly autonomous government, especially when poor developing countries are trying to lip-frog or catch-up with the (advanced capitalist nations), and that democratic politics are just too incoherent and unpredictable to provide such a structure (Huntington, 1993). A convincing argument has all been highlighted by scholars, mostly Asians, that the nexus between democracy and economic performance is not that resilient, they were of the opinion that the existing empirical tests are mixed since experience has also shown that authoritarian political system achieved a very high economic performance, they therefore, contend that there is no direct relationship between democracy and economic development (Helliwell, 1994; Lewis, 1994; Keefer and Knack, 1997). Again it is argued that democratic political system are most likely to be affected by inflation or stagnation as a result of interest group rent-seeking (Olson, 1993), and also susceptible to implementation of consumption –orient redistribution-type polices, like, social security spending instead of promoting investment in productive venture (Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). As a result of the above expositions, it has also been argued that authoritarian political system may therefore, be in a vantage position to impose and implement a sound economic policies and painful economic reforms because the leadership is relatively less responsive to the political demands and pressure from the citizen and other interest groups within the society in question (Oatley, 2004).

ODI (2007) highlighted the fact that those who contends that authoritarian political system are in general more effective than the democratic political system in promoting national development draws their analytical utility form the famous Asian miracle, or simply, the economic success of the East Asian Tigers, namely; South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong Kong. Where each state championed an unprecedented rapid economic development and a comprehensive transformation from the 1960s to late 1990s and in recent times, countries, such as China and Vietnam has also been used as empirical evidence to sustain these thesis. Also as have been suggested by scholars such as Evans (2012) and Hargard (1990), the secrets behind the East Asian developmental states can be found in what Evans has characterized as their “embedded autonomy”; or their state capacity to promote developmental objectives without being arrested by a definite form of interest while remaining “embedded in the society through a vigorous set of social relations that attach the state institution to the society and also provide an established conventional conduit for perpetual negotiation and renegotiation of national objectives and policies (Evans, 2012). As is evident in the East Asia experiment, embedded autonomy’ may be understood as an advanced exclusionary arrangement, whereby the managers of state institutions are connected not to the entire society per se, but to the dominant class within that society, most especially among the industrial class (ODI, 2007). He also argued that the third wave of democratization which swept the entire developing world, including many low income states, undoubtedly confirmed, the believe that, there are no structural prerequisite for the advent of democracy in any society and at the same time pointed out that only a few number of countries that experienced these democratization wave have successfully achieve a consolidated and functional democratic political system (ODI, 2007). In reexamining his ‘prerequisites’ theory in 1994, Lipset has suggested that while higher level of income may not completely be the Sin aqua non for democratization processes to start. They may be notwithstanding favorable for democracy to endure and become consolidated. In a famous quantitative analysis, Prezowski and Limongi (1997) have also discovered that economic growth has essential impact on the sustainability of a democratic political system. Studying a cross-regional data between 1950 and 1990 on a wide variety of poor-performing and fine-performing democratic regime, the authors discovered that the less successful democratic political systems are in establishing economic development, the more likely they are going to break down. But then, the fact that contrary to (Prezowski and Limongi, 1997) postulates or what they would have envisaged. That there has been no
official reversal to authoritarian political system especially among the poorest countries that were affected by the third wave of democratization may offer some kind of solace. This may be due to the fact that as society becomes more enlightened an outright authoritarian solution to domestic socio-cultural, political and economic problems becomes less likely to be tolerated within that given society. The above argument can be buttressed by the fact that some of the relatively most successful examples of newly democratizing nations in sub-Saharan African are coincidently among the poorest in the region like; Mali, Ghana, Benin etc whose per capital incomes in 2001, about a decade into democratization were US $220, US $390 for that year (ODI, 2007). However, the fact still remain that any democratic system that fail to produce developmental outcome would remain susceptible to a more unstable and fragile tendency. Though, Scholars have contended that, it may not be the high level of economic developments that triggers democratization but rather the manner in which these accumulated wealth are distributed among the people that is responsible for promoting the appropriate environments for democratic consolidation and stability. This school of thought is of the opinion that democratic institutions in any society can easily be managed or maintained when the national wealth is distributed equitably among the country’s population, because it is this equitable distribution that limit or ameliorate class struggle and promotes moderation in the society at large. Therefore, a suitable and institutional procedure had to be entrenched to ensure appropriate distribution of the national wealth among the concerned population.

Scholars has also attributed national development to spillover effect, that is, they argued that proximity factors cannot be ignored in the explanation of the sources of national development, this position must be derived from the fact that, in a study of South Asia: a development strategy for the information age, Hamid (2006) posit that, “spillover effect and neighborhood advantage can play an important role in economic development”. The noticeable point being made here is that on seeing development indicators in a nearby country can rekindle the zeal and challenge upon a given country to create or establish a developmental plan that can take them to the development stage of their neighbor or even surpass it. It has been argued that proximity to Japan, the first industrialized country outside Europe, ‘served as a powerful catalyst for entrepreneurial development in South Asia through the medium of direct investment and joint ventures”. This benefit of proximity as a catalyst for national development can rightly be argued to have eluded African countries since most of them, if not all of them are still in the latent stage of their national development process. Another serious polemic statement among social science scholars is that democratization can only enhance national development in already wealthy nations with very high state capacity and that authoritarian political system might be what is required in poorer nations with weak state institutions. In countries of such state institution authoritarian political system is argued to be the only means of stabilization of the society, enhancing the accumulation of capital investment and strengthening state institutions, and by so doing ultimately generate economic development for the entire population (Knutsen, 2006). However, the capacity of a particular political system in creating a progressive national productivity which is one of the parameter for measuring national development is highlighted in the argument of (Maxwell et al., 2009) “that concentration of state power, whether democratic system or not is an essential feature of all cases of rapid development” he maintained that the famous Asian tigers “whose societies were broadly homogeneous began to democratize to a certain extent in the 1980s after several decades of fast economic growth” (Maxwell et al., 2009). On the regime type hypothesis (Oatley, 2004) contend that “authoritarian regimes are more likely than democratic regimes to stabilize rapidly” Oakley, did not immediately offer the reason or the ground upon which he draw such inference or hypothesis, although he further argued that; “Because stabilization is costly, at least in the short run, government that are insulated from the political repercussions of costly economic policies can more easily stabilize. Governments in authoritarian regimes are insulated from such cost, whereas governments in democratic regimes are not” (Oatley, 2004). Another hypothesis from the author concerning the impact of political system on social stabilization stated that “social opposition and distributive conflict are more likely to occur in a democratic political system than authoritarian regimes. Consequently, the government in democratic regimes will be more inclined to delay stabilization” (2004), he further contends; That to be responsive to societal demands, consequently requires that, societal Government in democracies will be more sensitive to societal opposition and distributive conflict than government in authoritarian regimes. In democracies, social groups hold government accountable for their economic policies, and government’s intents on maintaining power against opposition, are likely to cause democratic government to search for alternatives before adopting austerity package (2004).

The author further contend that if there is no social opposition and distributive conflict in a democratic political system, then the system would definitely stabilize more rapidly than the authoritarian, but as soon as opposing social forces arise, democratic regime tend to delay stabilization, probably to carry the majority along. The conclusion is that different political systems, has substantial effects on the ability of the government to guarantee stabilization in the society. In summary, the authoritarian political system tends to eliminate the fiscal or social imbalance and make sure the economies are stabilized more rapidly than can ever be achieved is a democratic environment. So much on the issue of the relationship between the national development and a definite political system, we shall now turn to so empirical
indicators of the variables to buttress our point as they are
beginning to emerge.
Between 1971 and 1981 as presented in figure 1 and 2,
Indonesia exhibited a sustained economic growth. The
country’s GDP real growth were rising at an average rate of
7.7% annually; however this growth can be attributed partly
to the international oil price increase that quadrupled
within that period and which brought massive revenue to
Indonesia in the mid 1970s, in addition Indonesia was rated
as one of the fastest growing economy globally. As the
international oil price plummeted in 1986, Indonesia quickly
finds a new engine of growth, and transforms itself from a
dominant oil exporting, Country to a manufacturing economy.
It also attempted trade liberalization and enhanced global
integration. In fact, Indonesia was rated as one of the East
Asia success story throughout the 80s and up to 1996 on
economic and structural transformation (Goelton, 2007; Basri, 2013).
Nevertheless, when the AFC started in Thailand and spilled
over to Indonesia, forcing a significant depreciation of the
country’s Rupiah. It also created several other unpleasant
consequences, like, rising domestic debt, increasing
unemployment, bank rush and high inflation, coupled with
the spread of poverty and increasing government debt. The
crises hit several sectors and economic growth decreased by
13.7% construction sector decreased -39.8%, retail trade,
hotel and restaurant (-18.9%), while the finance sector
recorded -26.7%. Thereby increasing the poverty level to
24% (Mchimsey, 2002), but notwithstanding the huge
negative economic growth Indonesia managed to reinvigorate
the economic growth, entered the recovery process and has
been pushing on continuously and steadily since then, even
during the period of GFC, global financial crisis” (2008-2009)
their economy is one of the few that continued to record a
positive growth rate notwithstanding. In any case, figure 1
and figure 2 present a detailed history of the Indonesia GDP
trend in Indonesia between 1990 and 2014. It emphasizes on
employment, bank rush and high inflation, coupled with
unemployment, bank rush and higher inflation, increased
with the spread of poverty and increasing government debt. The
crises hit several sectors and economic growth decreased by
13.7% construction sector decreased -39.8%, retail trade,
hotel and restaurant (-18.9%), while the finance sector
recorded -26.7%, Thereby increasing the poverty level to
25.7% in 1998, (Fig. 4), but notwithstanding the huge
negative economic growth within the period (Fig. 1 and 2)
Indonesia managed to reinvigorate the economic growth,
entered the recovery process and has been pushing on
continuously and steadily since then, even during the period
of GFC, global financial crisis” (2008-2009) the Indonesia
economy is one of the few that continued to record a positive
growth rate notwithstanding, see figure 1 and 2 which
present a detailed historical exposition of Indonesia GDP
growth rate between 1961 and 2014. This covers both the era
of military dictatorship up to the present democratic political
dispensation in the country, which is our major concern in
this study. However, prior to the AFC there were reasonably


Figure 1: Indonesia economic growth (%) (1961–2000).

Figure 2: Indonesia GDP real growth rate 1999-2014. Source: CIA world factbook 30th June 2015; IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO), April 2015.

Figure 3: Indonesia Unemployment rate (%). Source: IMF, World Economic outlook April 2015. International Labour Organization (ILO).

Figure 4: The total number of poor and near poor in Indonesia (selected years). Source: Statistics Indonesia, SEADI and CEDS. But the bar chat was constructed by the scholar using Microsoft excel package.
very few government policies that has the interest of the poor in its agenda. Consequently many poor people were left out of the development gain. Therefore, when the financial shockwave began in 1997 the low-income earners or alternatively the poor were the worst hit because they were to a certain extent more directly exposed to the shock. This unfortunate incidence led to the recorded significant increase in the number of Indonesian population living below the official poverty line to 25.7% in 1998. A record that has never been experienced in the country’s poverty history since 1976 (Fig. 4). As at 2016 approximately 11.5% of Indonesia populations are living below the official poverty line, though, beyond this figure it is also estimated that there are citizens who are classify as vulnerable within the population. This implies that, their positions or classification are not yet consolidated in their present situation, therefore, they are most likely to fall below the poverty line at the slightest wave of economic cataclysm but that is not the issue in focus here. However, so much on the issue of empirical exposition, we shall now conclude this study by taking a closer look at the impact or effect of the military dictatorship and democratic political system on the national development of Indonesia after which we shall take a stand.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

National development as perceived in this study is derived from the famous Dudley Sears’s magnum opus, as highlighted hitherto. In this study Dudley contends that the questions to be asked when measuring the degree of a country’s development should be first and foremost, what has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to poverty? And what has been happening to inequality? He maintained that if all three of the above social quandary have declined from high level then beyond doubt these has been a period of national development for the society concerned. However, he also posits that if one or two of these central problem have been growing worst especially if all the three have been growing worst then it would be strange to call the outcome national development even if the GDP or GDP per capita income has doubled within the period under study (Seers, 1969). Therefore, the national development as envisaged here must have purpose and that purpose should be man himself as both the object as well as the subject of development. On the other hand, there is still the acceptance of the desirability of economic growth as part of national development but we consciously underline the equally the vital need for the distribution of equity, if only to enhance the life of man in his environment. Therefore, In this study national development is seen as a holistic phenomena, the emphases being man overall wellbeing in the society.

In the preceding section, using the time series analysis we have seen that in virtually all the development indicators employed in this study which was derived from the 2015 United Nations/World bank development indicators, but with a particular attention on economy, such as GDP real growth rate, unemployment trends and the rate of poverty incidence, Indonesia have been busy both in the negative and positive side of the development indicators employed in this study between 1960s and 2014. We also noticed from the preceding chapter that the democratization process in Indonesia between 1998 and 2014 has a positive correlation with some national development indicators insofar as it enhances their growth or development, notwithstanding the conspicuous differences in the growth rate and pace of the two epochs under study, which appear to support the hypotheses that democratic political system with its concomitant market liberalization would by implication be equipped with the capacity to establish and accelerate national development in such a way that a pseudo-democratic political system cannot be able to do. The problem is that, it’s not in all aspect of development indicator that this has happened since this study has revealed that some development indicators such as unemployment rate and the poverty incidence did relatively better during the era of military dictatorship in Indonesia (Fig. 3 and 4). Even the GDP real growth rate on comparative appraisal fared relatively better on average during their authoritarian era (Fig. 1 and 2). Nevertheless, it also implies that democratic institution promotes developmental governance by countering temptation for political opportunist behavior that can be economically damaging and reactionary in a given socio-economic formation, as already highlighted by Lancet (2004). Unfortunately that is not our major concern in this exercise since our main aim is to understand which of the political system, (military dictatorship or democratization) did comparatively better in Indonesia in terms of national development.

The empirical data therefore contend that authoritarian political system in Indonesia is more organized and developmentally minded than its democratic counterpart, considering the fact that the military Indonesia were able to reduce unemployment to as low as 1.52% in 1984 (Kaitović, 2013) and thereby creating a super conducive situation and or, environment for its successor political system (democratic) to build upon. The above analysis appears to support the hypotheses which argued that ‘national development is neither exclusively a function of democratic system nor that of authoritarian regime or political system, but a function or a consequence of interplay between the socio-economic, political and cultural environment’. This implies that the national development of any given society is and must be people oriented rather than political system base. In other words the people have to come together and agree among themselves that a developmental project has to be embarked upon (Bellinger Jr and Arce, 2011). It seems to us at this point that what is in issue here is no longer the minor matters of the state forms, but the nature of the state. And understanding the profundity of this debate is fundamental on our understanding the fact that it was crises that first involved the ultimate substance of society’s constitution (Onyishi and Okou, 2017). What are we trying to imply? Our point of departure is this; government in the final
analysis is seen in this study as the primary agency of the modern state, whether democratic or military dictatorship. This primary agency is managed by men who were able to attain and sustain preeminence through various designs, including authoritative applications and or threat of use of physical force. The political philosophy or ideologies of these government managers automatically becomes the official ideology of that collectivity independent of the state forms. If it is developmental, then it will herald a developmental state just like in Indonesia but if it’s reactionary it will bring a conservative state just like in some third world countries. Democracy or democratization has no role to play under these circumstances vis-à-vis the national development of a given society.

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